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Abstract
Inductive game theory has been developed to explore the origin of beliefs of a
person from his accumulated experiences of a game situation. So far, the theory has
been restricted to a person’s view of the structure not including another person’s
thoughts. In this paper, we explore the experiential origin of one’s view of the
other’s beliefs about the game situation. We restrict our exploration to a 2-role
(strategic) game, which has been recurrently played by two people with occasional
role-switching. Each person accumulates experiences of both roles by switching
roles, and these experiences become the source for his transpersonal view about
the other. Reciprocity in the sense of role-switching is crucial for deriving his
own and the other’s beliefs. We consider how a person can use these views for his
behavior revision, and we deﬁne an equilibrium called an intrapersonal coordination
equilibrium. Based on this concept, we show that cooperation will emerge as the
degree of reciprocity increases.
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1. Introduction
The problem of how a person obtains his own beliefs about other persons’ thoughts
has not yet been adequately addressed in the game theory and economics literature.
Instead, it is typical to assume well-formed beliefs about the game for each player. The
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§University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia, (j.kline@uq.edu.au)beliefs we refer to are beliefs about the structure of the game including such aspects
as the relevant players, possible sequence of moves, available actions at each move, and
resulting outcomes. These are not simply probabilistic beliefs about chance or strategies
of the other players. The present authors [9], [10] and [11] have developed inductive game
theory (IGT)1 in order to explore experiential sources for individual beliefs.
This paper takes one step further by positing that role-switching acts as an experi-
ential source for one’s beliefs about the beliefs of others. By occasional role-switching,
each person obtains a richer set of experiences, and he may use it to construct a richer
social view. In addition, role-switching may have some behavioral implications on coop-
eration among involved people. In this paper, we consider only 2 person role-switching
situations, since there is already much to be learned from them.
A simple example of 2 person role-switching as a source for experiential learning
about the other is found in the daily activities between a wife and a husband. They may
divide their family tasks into the roles of “raising the children” and “budget allocation”.
By switching these roles from time to time, each may learn the other’s perspective, and
ultimately, the partners may ﬁnd a more cooperative approach to their family aﬀairs.
Although we will study a speciﬁc 2 person situation with role-switching, it important
to emphasize that each such situation occurs within an entire social web like the one
described in Fig.1.1.
Let us look at this ﬁgure in more detail in order to elaborate on the development
of our theory. First, Go(1,2) describes an instance of a 2 person game Go with role a
taken by person 1 and role b taken by person 2. The instance Go(2,1) is based on the
same game Go, except the roles are switched. As mentioned above, we have included
diﬀerent games like G2 to keep in mind that each player participates in a variety of
games, not only G0.
In order to describe the role-switching, we distinguish between a role and a person.
A role corresponds to what game theorist refer to as a player. A person, on the other
hand, is an individual who participates in a social web like Fig.1.1 taking on various
roles in various game. For our analysis of role-switching, we will focus on a speciﬁc
pair of people, 1 and 2, and a speciﬁc 2-role game Go with roles a and b. We presume
that each person i = 1,2 can separate this Go from the other 2 person games, and he
keeps memories, from playing Go with the other person, in the form of a memory kit2
described in Section 2. We remind the reader that in IGT a person has little prior
information about Go. He uses his memories over the repeated plays of Go to both
construct his view of Go, and also to adjust his behave in Go. Our interest in how
role-switching aﬀects his view and behavior.
1A seminal form of IGT was given in Kaneko-Matsui [12].
2The cognitive limititions on a person are implicit in our formulation of a memory kit which ignores
the precise sequence of past plays of G
o. This formulation is justiﬁed by the epistemic postulates
formulated in Section 2.2 which embody bounded rationality aspects of people.
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Figure 1.1: Social Web
Our development and ﬁndings are greatly inﬂuenced by the works of Mead [15] (cf.,
Collins [4], Chap.7) on the importance of role-switching for obtaining a social view, and
Lewis [14] on common knowledge. When two people switch social roles reciprocally, each
has played each role many times and has seen the other person in each corresponding
role. Based on these experiences, each may guess that the other’s beliefs and perspective
are similar to his own. This reciprocity may be regarded as giving each person “reason
to believe” that the other has had the same experience. Lewis [14] required reason to
believe in his in his deﬁnition of “common knowledge”3. Though we treat shallow beliefs
here, we require reason to believe for the formation of beliefs about the other’s beliefs.
Mead [15] has also been inﬂuential, in particular, in suggesting the importance of
role-switching for obtaining a social perspective. One point of tension and dispute is
that thinking about the other’s understanding will lead to cooperation. This idea was
emphasized by Mead [15] and his predecessor, Cooley [5], to argue the pervasiveness
of cooperation in human society. This was criticized as too naive by later sociologists
(see Collins [4], Chap.7). In our theory, cooperation is one possibility obtained by
role-switching, but not necessarily guaranteed. We are interested in how role-switching
aﬀects the formation of individual preferences and decision making. In particular, we
formulate hypotheses about the importance of role-switching for the emergence of co-
operation between two persons.
Here, we give a summary of the new concepts that will be used in this paper empha-
sizing some important results. Since our approach is based on IGT developed in Kaneko-
Kline [9], the concepts of a memory kit and inductively derived views (i.d.views) deﬁned
there will be taken and adjusted as necessary to ﬁt the current context of role-switching.
We remind the reader that IGT starts with the no prior knowledge assumption that each
3This is reminiscent of the ﬁxed-point characterization of “common knowledge” (cf., Fagin et al. [6]
and Kaneko [8]).
3person has little knowledge about the game structure in the beginning. Under this as-
sumption, a person must collect some experiences from playing the game in order to
acquire some understanding of the situation.
The new concepts are:
(1): A 2-role Game in a Recurrent Situation and Role-switching: We assume that a
particular situation G0 in Fig.1.1 is given as a 2-role strategic game Go with the dis-
tinction between the roles and persons. Each of the two persons takes one role in each
instance of Go, and they switch the roles from time to time. Frequency of each role is
externally given, but each person has some subjective memory of this frequency. The
key departure from the previous work in IGT is the introduction of role-switching.
(2): Transpersonal Understandings: The transpersonal understanding is a new descrip-
tion of a person’s thought of the other’s understanding of the game Go. It is added to
incorporate his beliefs about the other’s beliefs. This is an extension of the notion of an
i.d.view given in Kaneko-Kline [9] in the present context. To avoid confusion, we refer
to i’s own i.d.view as his direct understanding, and his belief about j’s i.d.view as his
transpersonal understanding.
The direct and transpersonal understanding are still static descriptions, though they
come from the dynamic interactions in the recurrent situation. When a person adds
speciﬁc dynamic aspects to the static descriptions, he obtains an inductively derived
view, to be deﬁned in Section 4. The dynamic nature of this i.d.view distinguishes it
from the i.d.view developed in Kaneko-Kline [9].
Table 1.1: PD
sb1 sb2
sa1 (5,5)
ICE (2,6)
sa2 (6,2) (3,3)
NE
Table 1.2: SH1 Table 1.3: SH2
sb1 sb2
sa1 (7,7)
NE,ICE (1,4)
sa2 (4,1) (2,2)
NE
sb1 sb2
sa1 (7,7)
NE,ICE (1,4)
sa2 (4,1) (3,3)
NE,ICE
(3): Intrapersonal coordination equilibrium (ICE): This is deﬁned for the case when
the people use both their direct and transpersonal understandings. It coincides with
Nash equilibrium in the case of no role-switching. When role-switching is suﬃciently
reciprocal, it is determined by the unweighted joint payoﬀ sum maximization on the
domain over unilateral deviations. For example, in the game of Table 1.1 (Prisoner’s
Dilemma), the ICE is given as (sa1,sb1), which is not an NE. Table 1.2 (Stag Hunt 1)
has also (sa1,sb1) as a unique ICE, which is a NE, while the other NE (sa2,sb2) is not
4an ICE. However, in Table 1.3 (SH2) which diﬀers only at the payoﬀs, the strategy pair
(sa2,sb2) becomes a new ICE. This diﬀerences between Nash equilibrium and ICE are
fundamental distinctions between IGT with role-switching and standard game theory.
It is important to emphasize that the joint payoﬀ sum maximization needs the use of
both the direct and transpersonal understandings. With only the direct understanding,
we would again resort to Nash equilibrium behavior (Theorem 4.1).
A key diﬀerentiating the ICE from NE is to take a novel eﬀect of role-switching
into account; speciﬁcally, the fact that each person puts his feet into the other’s shoes
aﬀects his decision making as well as his understanding. role-switching also enables each
person with an understanding of the social situation including the other’s thoughts.
Behaviorally, the ICE leads each person to maximize the weighted payoﬀ sum based on
frequencies of roles over the domain of unilateral deviations for both roles.
The precise conditions of reciprocity and experiences for the emergence of this payoﬀ
sum maximization are described in Section 5. When those conditions are met, we
obtain a utilitarian theorem (Theorem 5.3) which states that the frequency weights of
role-switching disappear, and the ICE maximizes the unweighted sum of joint payoﬀs.
Although we emphasize the case of high reciprocity and the utilitarian theorem, the
case of low reciprocity is also considered. In the extreme case of no role-switching, ICE
coincides with NE (Theorem 5.1.(2)).
In summary, when reciprocity is low or the transpersonal understanding is ignored
(partial use of the i.d.view), we predict a Nash outcome. On the other hand, when
role-switching is reciprocal enough, we get the utilitarian result. Thus, we predict the
emergence of cooperation from role-switching. This has some implications for the theory
of social morality, which are discussed in Section 6. Also, we discuss an implication to
the literature of cooperative game theory in Section 8.
Before going to the main body of the paper, we give two comments: one on Lewis’
[14] approach to “common knowledge”, and the other on the repeated game approach
(cf., Osborne-Rubinstein [17]), since both seem related.
In our deﬁnition of a transpersonal understanding we will require that a person
has a reason from experiences to believe the other person has the same beliefs. This
requirement is stated by Lewis, though abstractly, to deﬁne the concept of common
knowledge. In this paper, we stop at shallow depths of interpersonal beliefs, but formu-
late an experiential version of his idea of a “reason to believe”. A continuation of our
research is to study a hierarchy of interpersonal beliefs in the common knowledge logic
or universal-type space approach. We discuss this aspect in Section 8.
The repeated game approach is similar to our approach in that both target recurrent
situations and discuss cooperation as a possible outcome. Nevertheless, these approaches
have radical diﬀerences in their basic cognitive postulates. The repeated game approach
formulates the entire situation as a huge one-shot game. When cooperation is obtained,
it is interpreted as describing ex ante decision making. This requires each player to know
5the entire game structure. In our approach, the views of the players are emerging with
their experiences. This diﬀerence allows us to discuss both the emergence of persons’
understandings of the recurrent situation, as well as the emergence of cooperation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the basic deﬁnitions of a 2-
role game, the domain of experiences, etc. Section 3 deﬁnes person’s direct understand-
ing of the situation and the transpersonal understanding of the other’s understanding,
which is an intermediate step to the main deﬁnition of an i.d.view given in Section 4.
In Section 5, two variants of an intrapersonal coordination equilibrium are deﬁned and
studied. In Section 6, we will consider implications of the results obtained in Section
5. In Section 7, we will discuss external and internal reciprocal relations between the
persons. In Section 8, we will discuss possible extensions of our approach as well as
implications of our cooperation result to some extant game theory literature.
2. Two-Person Strategic Game with Social Roles
In Section 2.1, we give deﬁnitions of the 2-role game with role-switching and of a memory
kit. In Section 2.2, we discuss the underlying recurrent situation behind a memory kit
in an informal manner.
2.1. 2-Role Strategic Game, Role Assignments, and Memory Kits
We start with a 2-role (strategic) game G = (a,b,Sa,Sb,ha,hb), where a and b are
(social) roles, Sr = {sr1,...,sr￿r} is a ﬁnite set of actions, and hr : Sa × Sb → R is
a payoﬀ function for role r = a,b. Each role is taken by a person i = 1,2. A role
assignment π is a one-one mapping from {a,b} to {1,2}, which describes the role taken
by each persons in a particular instance of G. The expression π = (ia,ib) means that
persons ia and ib take roles a and b. We use the convention that if r = a (or b),
then s(−r) ≡ s−r = sb (or sa), but (sr;s−r) = (sa,sb), and that when we focus on
person i, the other person is denoted by j. A 2-person (strategic) game with social roles
G(π) = (ia,ib,Sa,Sb,ha,hb) is given by adding a role assignment π = (ia,ib) to a 2-role
strategic game G.
Since the situation is recurrent, the information structure of observations after each
play of a game should be speciﬁed. We assume that after each play of G(π), each person
i at role r observes
Assumption Ob: the action pair (sa,sb) played and his own payoﬀ hr(sa,sb) in G(π).
Since payoﬀs represent subjective elements, each person is assumed to observe his own
payoﬀ in each play. Here, we assume that each person recognizes each payoﬀ value
hr(sa,sb) only when he experiences it, but he does not know the function hr itself.
6He may come to know some part of the payoﬀ function only after he has accumulated
enough memories.
Now, we consider person i’s accumulation of experiences from the 2-role strategic
game G up to a particular point of time. They are summarized as a memory kit κi =
￿(so
a,so
b),(Dia,Dib),(hia,hib);(ρia,ρib)￿, which consists of
κ1: the pair (so
a,so
b) ∈ Sa × Sb of regular actions;
κ2: the accumulated domain of experiences Di = (Dia,Dib) from taking role r = a,b,
where (so
a,so
b) ∈ Dia ∪ Dib ⊆ Sa × Sb;
κ3: person i’s observed payoﬀ functions (hia,hib) over Di, where hir : Dir → R and
hir(sa,sb) = hr(sa,sb) for all (sa,sb) ∈ Dir and r = a,b;
κ4: person i’s (subjective) frequency weights (ρia,ρib) for roles a and b, where ρia+ρib =
1, ρia,ρib ≥ 0.
Person i has acquired these by playing game G with diﬀerent roles from time to time.
Condition κ1 means that the persons regularly play actions so
a and so
b when they are
assigned to roles a and b. Condition κ2 states that person i has accumulated experiences
Dia and Dib of action pairs from roles a and b. We allow Dia or Dib to be empty, though
one of them is nonempty since (so
a,so
b) ∈ Dia∪Dib. The third components, (hia,hib), are
the perceived payoﬀ functions over (Dia,Dib), which are assumed to take the observed
values of the payoﬀ functions (ha,hb). The last component (ρia,ρib) expresses person
i’s subjective evaluation of frequencies of roles a and b. Accurate weights are not really
our intention, but here we assume that it is a single vector for each i.
We assume the following on a memory kit:
for all r = a,b, if (sa,sb) ∈ Dir, then (sa,so
b) ∈ Dir and (so
a,sb) ∈ Dir; (2.1)
ρir = 0 if and only if Dir = ∅. (2.2)
Condition (2.1) states that if (sa,sb) is accumulated in Dir, then (sa,so
b) and (so
a,sb)
coming from the unilateral trials of sa and sb from (so
a,so
b) are also accumulated in
Dia ∪ Dib. Condition (2.2) states that ρir = 0 means that person i has no recollection
of being in role r. By this, ρir > 0 if and only if Dir ￿= ∅, which is further equivalent,
by (2.1), that (so
a,so
b) ∈ Dir.
Some cognitive limitations associated with bounded rationality are implicit in our
formulation of a memory kit in IGT. In particular, we do not include the entire sequence
of past memories in the memory kit. This type of simpliﬁcation is justiﬁed by the
cognitive postulates described in Section 2.2 which we attribute to people in IGT.
Using (2.1) twice, we have the following lemma: if person i has some experience at
role r in his mind, the pair of regular actions is accumulated at that role.
Lemma 2.1. If Dir ￿= ∅, then (so
a,so
b) ∈ Dir.
7When (sr;so
−r) ∈ Dir, it is called an active experience for person i at role r. That is,
if person i makes a deviation and it remains in his domain, it is an active experience.
When (sr;so
−r) ∈ Di(−r), it is a passive experience for person i at role −r.
Reciprocity is important in this paper, but we have various notions and degrees of
reciprocity. An important one is between Dia and Dib for the same person i. First we
deﬁne the set Proj(T) := {(sa,sb) ∈ T : sa = so
a or sb = so
b}, where T ⊆ Sa × Sb and
(so
a,so
b) ∈ T. Then, we say that Dia and Dib are internally reciprocal iﬀ
Proj(Dia) = Proj(Dib), (2.3)
This requires the equivalence of Dia and Dib up to unilateral changes from the regular
actions (so
a,so
b). A stronger reciprocity is Dia = Dib, but (2.3) is more relevant in this
paper. The choice of the word “internally” in the deﬁnition of (2.3) is to stress that
this condition is about reciprocity across domains of a single person i. However, since
person i interacts with person j, this internal reciprocity may be externally motivated.
In Section 7, we show how the internal reciprocity of (2.3) can be derived entirely from
external conditions on reciprocity.
By (2.2), ρr = 0 is incompatible with (2.3). It would be natural to introduce lower
and upper bounds for ρr for these domains. In Section 5.2, we will give bounds when
we talk about the utilitarian result (Theorem 5.3).
Consider two examples for the domains (D1a,D1b) and (D2a,D2b).
(1)(Non-reciprocal Domains): Let DN
1 = (DN
1a,DN
1b) be given as follows:
DN
1a = {(sa,so
b) : sa ∈ Sa} and DN
1b = ∅. (2.4)
Let DN
2 = (DN
2a,DN
2b) be deﬁned in a symmetric manner. By (2.2), ρ1a = ρ2b = 1. In
this case, each person makes deviations over all his actions, but each accumulates only
active experiences: He is either insensitive to (or ignores) the deviations by the other
person. Internal reciprocity (2.3) does not hold for these domains.
There are other non-reciprocal domains. For example, each person is sensitive to
both active and passive deviations. These domains are not yet internally reciprocal.
We have also varieties of reciprocal domains. We focus on one reciprocal case, which
satisﬁes internal reciprocity (2.3).
(2)(Active-Passive Domain): DAP
1 = (DAP
1a ,DAP
1b ) for person 1 is given as:
DAP
1a = DAP
1b = {(sa,so
b) : sa ∈ Sa} ∪ {(so
a,sb) : sb ∈ Sb}. (2.5)
This domain for player 2 is deﬁned in the same manner. Person 1 makes trials with all
actions across both roles, and he is sensitive to 2’s trials as well as his own, but not
joint-trials.
82.2. Informal Postulates for Behavior and Accumulation of Memories
Our mathematical theory starts with a memory kit κi = ￿(so
a,so
b),(Dia,Dib),(hia,hib);
(ρia,ρib)￿. Behind it, there is some underlying process of behavior and accumulation of
memories. We now describe the basic postulates for such a process, which are given in
Kaneko-Kline [9] with an addition of BH0 for role-switching.
The additional one is stated explicitly as a postulate.
Postulate BH0 (Switching the Roles): The role assignment changes from time to
time, which is exogenously determined.
We make the two behavioral postulates: BH1 requires the rule-governed behavior
of each person in the recurrent situation ...,Go(1,2),Go(2,1),...,Go(1,2),... Postulate
BH2 describes how a person makes trials and errors.
Postulate BH1 (Regular actions): Each person typically behaves following the reg-
ular action so
r when he is assigned to role r.
Postulate BH2 (Occasional Deviations): Once in a while (infrequently), each per-
son at role r unilaterally and independently makes a trial deviation sr ∈ Sr from his
regular action so
r, and then returns to so
r.
In the beginning, each person started behaving almost randomly, and then may have
adopted the regular actions so
a and so
b for roles a and b for some time without thinking,
maybe, since he found it worked well in the past or he was taught to follow it. Early
on, such deviations may be unconscious and/or not well thought out. Nevertheless, a
person might ﬁnd that a deviation leads to a better outcome, and he may start making
deviations consciously. Once he has become conscious of his behavior-deviation, he
might make more and/or diﬀerent trials.
Learning is possible when there is some regularity; a simple form of regularity is
assumed in BH1. Without assuming regular actions and/or patterns, a person may not
be able to extract any causality from his experiences. To learn parts other than the
regular actions, the persons need to make some trial deviations, which is described by
BH2. It may be the case that the regular actions are person-dependent, but as stated in
BH1, we restrict our attention to the case where both persons follow the same regular
action for each role.
What person i receives in an instant is described by his local (short-term) memory,
which takes the form of ￿r,(sa,sb),hir(sa,sb) = hr(sa,sb)￿. Once this triple is trans-
formed to a long-term memory, his domain Dir is extended into Dir ∪ {(sa,sb)}, and
“hir(sa,sb) = hr(sa,sb)” is also recorded in the memory kit κi. For the transition from
local to long-term memories, we have various scenarios. Here we list postulates based
on bounded memory abilities.
Postulate EP1 (Forgetfulness): If experiences are not frequent enough, they would
not be transformed into a long-term memory and disappear from a person’s mind.
9Postulate EP2 (Habituation): A local memory becomes lasting as a long-term mem-
ory in the mind of a person by habituation, i.e., if he experiences something frequently
enough, it remains in his memory as a long-term memory.
When the persons follow their regular actions, the local memories given by them will
become long-term memories by EP2. A pair obtained by only one person’s deviation
from the regular behavior is more likely to remain in his memory than are pairs obtained
by joint deviations, which supports (2.1).
A memory kit describes a set of long-term memories, which have been accumulated
from the former experiences governed by Postulates EP1 and EP2. This excludes the
possibility that a person keeps an entire sequence of his former experiences. To keep a
long sequence of experiences needs the person to have a strong memory ability, which is
violated by EP1 and EP2. We assume that the long-term memories accumulated from
his experiences takes the form of a memory kit as described by κ1 − κ44.
Those postulates can be tested in experiments; Takeuchi et al. [20] undertook an
experimental study of the validity of some of the postulates. We give a brief discussion
on this in Section 6.
3. Direct and Transpersonal Understandings from Experiences
When a person considers the situation G based on his accumulated experiences, he meets
two problems: (i) his own understanding about G; and (ii) his thought of the other’s
understanding of about G. The former is obtained by combining his experiences, while
the latter needs some additional interpersonal thinking. In this section, we describe how
a person deals with these problems. We do not yet include the regular actions (so
a,so
b)
and frequency weights (ρia,ρib), which will be taken into account in the deﬁnition of an
inductively derived view in Section 4. In this sense, the following are static descriptions
of the underlying game G.
We state our basic ideas for the above mentioned problems as informal postulates
before mathematizing them. The ﬁrst postulate is for the above mentioned (i).
Postulate DU (Direct Understanding of the Object Situation): A person com-
bines his accumulated experiences to construct his view on the situation in question.
This will be presently formulated as his own understanding gii of game g. We turn
our attention to his thought of the other person’s understanding gij of g. We adopt two
postulates for it:
Postulate TP1 (Projection of Self to the Other): Person i projects some of his
experienced payoﬀs onto person j, when i experientially believes that j has experienced
those payoﬀs.
4An explicit process of transformation from experiences (short-term memories) to long-term memories
is given in Akiyama, et al. [1].
10By Assumption Ob, he observes only his own payoﬀs. To think about the other’s
payoﬀs, he uses his experienced payoﬀs. By postulate TP1, we propose that a person
projects his experiences onto the other. Nevertheless, TP1 is a conditional statement.
We require some experiential evidence for person i to believe that j knows the payoﬀ,
which is expressed as the next postulate.
Postulate TP2 (Experiential Reason to Believe): Person i believes that j has
experienced payoﬀs only when i has a suﬃcient experiential reason for it.
A simple metaphor may help the reader understand those postulates5: A boy notices
that a girl appears in suﬀering from the agony of a broken heart. He had experiences of
a broken heat a few times, and understands that it is painful. Also, he knows who has
caused her broken heart. Here, he projects his former experiences of having pains to
her. The ability of projecting his former experiences is stated by TP1, and the reason
for her broken heart is required by TP2. In the case where he has no idea of her broken
heart, he doubts her behavior; he may think that she is pretending in that manner.
Let us return to our mathematical world. Suppose that person i has accumulated
his experiences in a memory kit κi = ￿(so
a,so
b), (Dia,Dib),(hia,hib);(ρia,ρib)￿. He now
constructs his direct understanding including own payoﬀ functions for roles a and b, and
also infers/guesses his transpersonal understanding of the other’s understanding. The
former is purely based on person i’s experiences by DU. However, for the latter, we need
a diﬀerent kind of treatment reﬂecting postulates TP1 and TP2.
These are formulated in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Direct and Transpersonal Understandings). Let a memory kit
κi = ￿(so
a,so
b), (Dia,Dib),(hia,hib);(ρia,ρib)￿ be given:
(1): The direct understanding (d-understanding) of the situation from κi by person i
is given as gii = (a,b,Si
a,Si
b,hii
a,hii
b ) :
ID1i: Si
r = {sr : (sr;s−r) ∈ Dia ∪ Dib for some s−r} for r = a,b;
ID2ii: for r = a,b, hii
r : Si
a × Si
b → R is deﬁned as follows:
hii
r (sa,sb) =



hr(sa,sb) if (sa,sb) ∈ Dir
θr otherwise,
(3.1)
where the value θr is assumed to satisfy6
θr < min
(sa,sb)
hr(sa,sb). (3.2)
5In the example of a base ball team, Mead [15] argued that switching positions often help the players
to improve their performance.
6This θr can be extended to allow dependence upon persons, and even upon actions, as far as (3.2)
is satisﬁed.
11(2): The transpersonal understanding (tp-understanding) from κi by person i for person
j is given as gij = (a,b,Si
a,Si
b,h
ij
a ,h
ij
b ), where h
ij
a and h
ij
b are new and given as:
ID2ij: for r = a,b, h
ij
r : Si
a × Si
b → R by
hij
r (sa,sb) =



hr(sa,sb) if (sa,sb) ∈ Dir ∩ Di(−r)
θr otherwise.
(3.3)
All the components of gii and gij, except θr for the unexperienced part of Si
a ×
Si
b, are determined by memory kit κi. The deﬁnition of gii is straightforward; the d-
understanding gii is deﬁned as a 2-role game, based on his experiences. In ID1i, all the
experienced actions are taken into account. In ID2ii, he constructs his observed payoﬀ
function. The value θr expresses an unknown (unexperienced) payoﬀ and is assumed to
be small enough which will be important for our existence result of Theorem 5.1.
Consider gij. The diﬀerence between gij and gii is only in terms the payoﬀs of (3.1)
and (3.3) for an experienced pair (sa,sb). For hii
r (sa,sb) = hr(sa,sb), (3.1) require only
that i has experienced (sa,sb) at the role r. However, for h
ij
r (sa,sb) = hr(sa,sb), (3.3)
requires that i has experienced (sa,sb) at both roles: “(sa,sb) ∈ Dir” corresponds to
Postulate TP1, i.e., he could project his experience onto the other. But we also require
the additional “(sa,sb) ∈ Di(−r)” in (3.3), which corresponds to TP2: he should only
make this projection if he has the reason to believe that the other has observed his
payoﬀ. When (sa,sb) ∈ Dir but (sa,sb) / ∈ Di(−r), person i does not have a reason to
believe that j ever experienced payoﬀ hr(sa,sb), and thus, he does not project his payoﬀ
experience onto person j.
Lewis [14] requires the existence of some reason to believe the other to have the
same knowledge for his deﬁnition of common knowledge. Postulate TP2 takes the same
idea from the experiential perspective. In this paper, we keep the shallow interpersonal
beliefs, but not to the common knowledge, since the present framework does not allow
us to formulate those explicitly. We will discuss higher order beliefs in Section 8.
Let us exemplify the above deﬁnitions with the PD game of Table 1.1 assuming the
regular actions (so
a,so
b) = (sa1,sb1):
(1)(Non-reciprocal Active Domain): Let (DN
1a,DN
1b) be given as the non-reciprocal
domain of (2.4), where we consider only G(1,2). Person 1’s d-understanding g11 = g11
is given as: S1
a = {sa1,sa2} and S1
b = {sb1}. Since 1 has experiences only for role a, the
payoﬀs (h11
a (sa,sb),h11
b (sa,sb)) are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1; g11 Table 3.2; g12
sb1
sa1 (5,θb)
sa2 (6,θb)
sb1
sa1 (θa,θb)
sa2 (θa,θb)
12Consider g12 : Person 1 has experienced the pairs in DN
1a, and from each pair, he
infers that person 2 observes also these pairs. Hence, 1 can assume the same S1
a and S1
b
for 2. But person 1 has a diﬃculty in inferring what payoﬀs 2 could receive from roles
a and b. The easier part is h12
b (sa,sb) = θb for role b since person 1 has no experiences
with role b. The other equation h12
a (sa,sb) = θa comes from (sa,sb) / ∈ DN
1b : He infers
from (sa,sb) / ∈ DN
1b that person 2 always plays role b and has no experiences with role
a. Thus, person 1 cannot project his experienced payoﬀ onto 2. In sum, person 1 has
no idea about person 2’s understanding of payoﬀ values.
The above observations hold more generally. Let gii = (a,b,Si
a,Si
b,hii
a,hii
b ) and
gij = (a,b,Si
a,Si
b,h
ij
a ,h
ij
b ) be the d- and tp-understandings.
Lemma 3.1: Let ρir = 1. Then, hii
−r(sa,sb) = h
ij
−r(sa,sb) = θ−r and h
ij
r (sa,sb) = θr
for all (sa,sb) ∈ Si
a × Si
b.
Proof. Since ρir = 1, we have Di(−r) = ∅ by (2.2). By (3.1) and (3.3), we have the
stated equations.
(2):(Reciprocal Active-Passive Domain): Let DAP
1 = (DAP
1a ,DAP
1b ) be the domains
given by (2.5). Then, S1
a = {sa1,sa2} and S1
b = {sb1,sb2}. Both g11 and g12 are given by
Table 3.3. Indeed, person 1 has had each experience along the top row and left column
from the perspective of each role. Thus, he can project his experiences onto 2. Only
the joint trials are excluded as they are outside the domains of accumulation.
Table 3.3; g11 and g12
a\b sb1 sb2
sa1 (5,5) (1,6)
sa2 (6,1) (θa,θb)
Internal reciprocity will be important in our later analysis. We give one theorem
that internal reciprocity (2.3) is necessary and suﬃcient for coincidence of a person’s
direct and transpersonal understandings up to the active and passive experiences. Let
gii and gij be the d- and tp-understandings from a memory kit κi.
Theorem 3.2 (Internal Coincidence): (Dia,Dib) is internally reciprocal if and only if
gii coincides with gij up to the active/passive experiences, i.e., hii
r (sa,sb) = h
ij
r (sa,sb) =
hr(sa,sb) for all (sa,sb) ∈ Proj(Si
a × Si
b) and r = a,b.
Proof. (Only-if): Suppose Proj(Dia) = Proj(Dib). Then, we show Proj(Si
a × Si
b) =
Proj(Dia) = Proj(Dib). Once this is shown, the only-if part is obtained.
Let (sa,sb) ∈ Proj(Si
a×Si
b). Then, (sa ∈ Si
a and sb = so
b) or (sb ∈ Si
b and sa = so
a). In
the ﬁrst case, (sa,tb) ∈ Dia ∪ Dib for some tb. By (2.1), (sa,so
b) ∈ Dia or (sa,so
b) ∈ Dib.
Since Proj(Dia) = Proj(Dib), we have (sa,so
b) ∈ Proj(Dia) = Proj(Dib). In the second
case, we have also (so
a,sb) ∈ Proj(Dia) = Proj(Dib). Conversely, let (sa,sb) ∈ Proj(Di
a).
13Then, (sa,sb) ∈ Di
a, which implies sa ∈ Si
a. Similarly, sb ∈ Si
b. Thus, (sa,sb) ∈ Si
a × Si
b.
Since sa = so
a or sb = so
b, we have (sa,sb) ∈ Proj(Si
a × Si
b).
(If): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose (sa,sb) ∈ Proj(Dir) and (sa,sb) / ∈ Proj(Di(−r)).
Since hii
r (sa,sb) = hr(sa,sb) by (3.1), and h
ij
r (sa,sb) = θr by (3.3), we have hii
r (sa,sb) =
hr(sa,sb) > θr = h
ij
r (sa,sb) by (3.2).
4. Inductively Derived Views for role-switching
The understandings gii and gij are static descriptions of the recurrent situation. The
situation includes temporal aspects such as the regular actions (so
a,so
b) and frequency
weights (ρia,ρib). We deﬁne the inductively derived view Γi by adding these two com-
ponents. It contains person i’s understanding and his belief about j’s understanding of
the recurrent situation. Person i uses Γi to revise his behavior. There are two cases:
the partial and full uses of Γi for the revision of behavior. In this section, we ﬁrst
present the inductively derived view Γi, and discuss the partial use of it. The full use
is discussed in Section 5.
4.1. Inductively Derived Views
As stated above, the target situation includes temporal aspects in addition to the static
descriptions gii and gij. Although making trials and errors is also temporal, it is of a
transitory nature. Our concern is to include temporal, but stationary aspects, namely:
the regular actions (so
a,so
b), and the frequency weights (ρia,ρib). We deﬁne the weighted
payoﬀ functions Hii and Hij using (ρia,ρib), where Hii is the weighted payoﬀ function
person i assigns to himself, and Hij is the weighted payoﬀ he assigns to j.
To describe these weighted payoﬀs formally, we introduce the expression [sa,sb]r
meaning that person i at role r plays sa while j at role −r plays sb. We consider the
recurrent situation where [sa,sb]a is played with frequency ρia, and [ta,tb]b is played
with frequency ρib = 1 − ρia. This situation is evaluated by person i as the weighted7
payoﬀ:
Hii([sa,sb]a,[ta,tb]b) = ρiahii
a(sa,sb) + ρibhii
b (ta,tb). (4.1)
Note that (sa,sb) and (ta,tb) may be identical.
The same situation is evaluated by i taking person j’s perspective as follows:
Hij([sa,sb]a,[ta,tb]b) = ρiah
ij
b (sa,sb) + ρibhij
a (ta,tb). (4.2)
7The sums with frequency weights are based on the frequentist interpretation of expected utility
theory, which is close to the original interpretation by von Neumann-Morgenstern [21]. See Hu [7] for a
direct approach to expected utility theory from the frequentist perspective.
14The diﬀerence from (4.1) is that h
ij
a and h
ij
b are used, and also that weight ρia is
multiplied to h
ij
b (sa,sb) and ρib to h
ij
a (sa,sb), since in i’s mind, j receives h
ij
b (sa,sb)
with weight ρia and h
ij
a (sa,sb) with weight ρib.
Although the above deﬁnitions look very restrictive relative to the standard deﬁni-
tion of the evaluation of an inﬁnite stream of outcomes in the repeated game approach
(cf., Osborne-Rubinstein [17]), our deﬁnitions of (4.1) and (4.2) are faithful to our mo-
tivation to study the emergence of experientially based beliefs obtained by boundedly
rational people.
Now, we have the deﬁnition of an inductively derived view.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The inductively derived view (i.d.view) from the memory kit κi =
￿(so
a,so
b),(Dia,Dib),(hia,hib);(ρia,ρib)￿ is given as Γi = ￿(so
a,so
b),(Si
a,Si
b),(ρia,ρib),Hii,Hij￿,
where Hii and Hij are the weighted payoﬀ functions given by (4.1) and (4.2) deﬁned8
over (Si
a × Si
b)2.
The deﬁnition of the i.d.view Γi has various diﬀerences from those given in Kaneko-
Kline [9], [10] and [11]. One apparent diﬀerence is that the above deﬁnition is given to
a strategic game but not an extensive game (or an information protocol). More impor-
tantly, the inclusion of the frequency weights to describe the impact of role-switching is
crucial and new.
Though our intention is for person i to use the tp-understanding Hij for his decision
making, we should also consider the case where i uses only the direct understanding for
his behavior. We divide our analysis into two cases:
C0(Partial Use): Person i uses only the payoﬀ function Hii.
C1(Full Use): Person i uses not only the payoﬀ function Hii but also Hij in order to
predict how person j will act (or react).
Either C0 or C1 may be taken as a decision criterion for person i. The ﬁrst case of C0
is handled in the next subsection where we ﬁnd that it leads to Nash equilibrium type
behavior. The second case of C1 is more novel and is handled in Section 5. There we
see the full force of role-switching as an experiential source for a player’s beliefs about
the other’s beliefs.
4.2. Partial Use of the I.D.View
In C0, person i can maximize his weighted payoﬀ Hii by choosing his action from the
assigned role in one play of the game. Since he uses only Hii, we need some behavioral
assumption about the other person’s action or reaction to his change. We adopt the
following conjectural postulate by person i when he takes an intensional deviation:
8It is our intention to deﬁne H
ii and H
ij over the unilateral domain {(s
o
r;s
o
−r) : (s
o
r;s
o
−r) ∈ Dir,r =
a,b}. However, we deﬁne them over (S
i
a × S
i
b)
2 to avoid notational complications.
15(∗): person j sticks to the regular action pair (so
a,so
b).
In this case, person i may choose a maximum point in Si
r against the regular action so
−r.
We require the the present regular actions (so
a,so
b) are free from such behavior revisions.
Thus, we have the following deﬁnition: (so
a,so
b) is a partial-use equilibrium (PUE) in Γi
iﬀ for all sa ∈ Si
a and sb ∈ Si
b,
Hii([so
a,so
b]a,[so
a,so
b]b) ≥ Hii([sa,so
b]a,[so
a,sb]b). (4.3)
That is, person i maximizes his direct understanding Hii, by controlling sa or sb when
he takes role a or b, respectively.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Partial-Use Equilibrium). The regular pair (so
a,so
b) is a PUE in Γi
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium in the d-understanding gii.
Proof. The deﬁnition of a PUE is expressed as: for all sa ∈ Si
a and sb ∈ Si
b,
ρiahii
a(so
a,so
b) + ρibhii
b (so
a,so
b) ≥ ρiahii
a(sa,so
b) + ρibhii
b (so
a,sb). (4.4)
By this, the if part is straightforward. We show the contrapositive of the only-if part.
Suppose that (so
a,so
b) is not a Nash equilibrium in gii. Then, there is some sa ∈ Si
a
or sb ∈ Si
b such that hii
a(so
a,so
b) < hii
a(sa,so
b) or hii
b (so
a,so
b) < hii
b (so
a,sb), respectively. If
hii
a(so
a,so
b) < hii
a(sa,so
b), then ρia > 0 by (2.2) and (3.1), and similarly if hii
b (so
a,so
b) <
hii
b (so
a,sb), then ρib > 0. In the former case, (4.4) does not hold if we plug (sa,so
b) to
the ﬁrst term of the right-hand side but (so
a,so
b) to the second term. The latter case is
parallel.
This states that the regular actions are free from behavior revisions based on the
d-understanding gii if and only if the regular action pair (so
a,so
b) is a Nash equilibrium
in gii. Theorem 4.1 holds with no additional restriction on the accumulated domain of
experiences, or on the frequency weights. Our intention for CO is mainly to handle the
non reciprocal cases where ρir = 1 for some r = a,b. When, this happens, it would be
natural to assume that ρjr = 0. In this case, we can apply the PUE concept to both
persons.
To consider this application, ﬁrst, we assume that the i.d.views of the two persons are
coherent with respect to frequency weights. We say that Γi = ￿(so
a,so
b),(Si
a,Si
b),(ρia,ρib),
Hii,Hij￿,i = 1,2 are mutually coherent iﬀ ρia = 1 − ρja. Also, we say that the pair
(so
a,so
b) of regular actions is a mutual PUE iﬀ it is a PUE for Γi and i = 1,2. Then we
have the following corollary from Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 4.2 (Mutual PUE for Non-reciprocal Cases). Let Γ1,Γ2 be the mu-
tually coherent i.d.views with ρ1a = 1, S1
a = Sa and S2
b = Sb. Then, (so
a,so
b) is a mutual
PUE if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium in the base game G.
16Proof. Since ρ1a = ρ2b = 1 and S1
a = Sa and S2
b = Sb, it holds that (sa,so
b) ∈ D1a for
all sa ∈ Sa and (so
a,sb) ∈ D2b for all sb ∈ Sb. These imply h11
a (sa,so
b) = ha(sa,so
b) for
all sa ∈ Sa and h22
b (so
a,sb) = hb(so
a,sb) for all sb ∈ Sb. These together with Theorem 4.1
imply that (so
a,so
b) is a Nash equilibrium in the base game G.
5. Intrapersonal Coordination Equilibria
Our main concern is the full use of the i.d.view Γi = ￿(so
a,so
b),(Si
a,Si
b),(ρia,ρib),Hii,Hij￿
for person i. Since person i can use both Hii and Hij, we should reconsider the conjec-
tural postulate (∗) for his behavior revision. In Section 5.1, we suggest an alternative
conjectural postulate. This leads to an equilibrium concept called ICE. In the remain-
ing, we study this equilibrium concept, and obtain some utilitarian result in reciprocal
domains.
5.1. Intrapersonal Coordination Equilibria
It is a salient diﬀerence between the partial use C0 and the full use C1 of the i.d.view
Γi that person i does not think about person j’s perspective in the former, but he does
in the latter. In C0, (∗) would be a natural conjectural postulate. If we stick to (∗),
we would eﬀectively return to the Nash equilibrium (Theorem 4.1) even for the case of
reciprocal role-switching. In the full use C1, however, person i can think about how
person j thinks about and responds to person i’s possible deviations. This leads him to
a diﬀerent conjectural postulate.
It is an alternative postulate that if person i deviates from so
r to some sr, then
(∗∗): person j also takes the same action sr when j takes role r.
This may be called the role model postulate. Person i needs a justiﬁcation for why he
expects person j to follow i’s deviation. He may ﬁnd a justiﬁcation for it since now he
can think about person j’s perspective by his i.d.view Γi. We still need two steps to
explain this justiﬁcation.
First, we explain it in a static manner, which takes place in person i’s mind. This
explains how both persons could be better oﬀ following (∗∗). But since person j, even in
the mind of person i, should be independent from person i, (∗∗) requires some external
coordination. For this, we refer to the role model argument: One person’s deviation
shows an initiative to the other person to deviate in a coordinate way, and expects the
other person understand and follow it. This is the second step, for which the restriction
on unilateral deviations, excluding joint deviations, is needed.
Suppose that both i and j would get higher payoﬀs if each deviates from so
a to sa
when each is assigned to role a. Person i understands this based on his i.d.view Γi, and
also, person i may understand that person j reaches the same understanding. Then
17person i justiﬁes postulate (∗∗). This argument is formally described in the language of
Γi : The ﬁrst part of person i’s understanding is expressed as:
Hii([so
a,so
b]a,[so
a,so
b]b) < Hii([sa,so
b]a,[sa,so
b]b). (5.1)
The assumption that j also switches at role a is expressed by [sa,so
b]b on the right
hand side of the inequality. The second part of person i’s belief on j’s understanding is
expressed as:
Hij([so
a,so
b]a,[so
a,so
b]b) < Hij([sa,so
b]a,[sa,so
b]b). (5.2)
When both (5.1) and (5.2) are satisﬁed for a deviation from so
a to sa, person i justiﬁes
postulate (∗∗). In a parallel manner, i can also consider unilateral improvements at role
b, i.e., switching from so
b to some other sb under the same conjectural postulate (∗∗).
We say that sr ∈ Si
r is a coordinately improving deviation (c-improving deviation)
from the regular actions (so
a,so
b) iﬀ (5.1) and (5.2) hold with the replacement of sa by
sr. We allow the weaker form of (5.1) and (5.2): That is, we consider a deviation in
the form that both (5.1) and (5.2) hold in weak inequalities with a strict inequality for
at least one person. When these hold, we call sr ∈ Si
r a weakly c-improving deviation.
Allowing this weak c-improving deviations, we avoid some diﬃculties arising when Hii
or Hij takes constant values.
The above argument itself does not exclude the possibility of joint deviations by
the two persons. However, such deviations require higher-order expectations. We avoid
this problem by the restriction on unilateral deviations, which is also related to the
second step of the justiﬁcation of postulate (∗∗). Postponing this argument later,
we now state the deﬁnition of our equilibrium concept in the full use of an i.d.view
Γi = ￿(so
a,so
b),(Si
a,Si
b),(ρia,ρib),Hii,Hij￿:
Deﬁnition 5.1 (ICE). The regular pair (so
a,so
b) is an intrapersonal coordination equi-
librium (ICE) in Γi iﬀ there is no weak c-improving unilateral deviation from (so
a,so
b).
This concept requires the regular pair (so
a,so
b) to be stable against such deviations.
The term “intrapersonal coordination” is motivated by the fact that possible deviations
are all considered by person i’s mind. The coordination issue is also related to this
term, and is baed on the role model argument. Now, let us consider it.
→
￿
1
so
a
2
so
b
￿
→
￿
1
sa
2
so
b
￿
→
￿
2
sa
1
so
b
￿
→
￿
2
sa
1
so
b
￿
→
Fig.5.1
Suppose that person 1 at role a deviates from so
a to sa based on his evaluations of
the conjectured improving deviation expressed in terms of (5.1) and (5.2). Since person
1 can change his action at one role at one time, this new situation is expressed as the
18second left state in Fig.5.1. Then person 2 will observe this deviation, and when he is
assigned to role a, he could follow this mutually beneﬁcial deviation sa, which is the
third state in Fig.5.1. Thus, person 1 can take an initiative to deviate from (so
a,so
b) to
sa : This is exactly the role model argument. We should remark that the argument is
about the external world, but, is thought by person i using his view Γi.
In the end of Section 5.1, we will give comments on a possible alternation of the
above deﬁnition to allow joint deviations at both roles simultaneously to (sa,sb) from
(so
a,so
b),and on coherency with the deﬁnition of a PUE.
Our ﬁrst formal result is about the existence of an ICE. The ﬁrst assertion is the
main point of Section 5.1, while the second is self-explanatory.
Theorem 5.1 (Existence). Let Γi be the i.d.view from a memory kit κi = ￿(so
a,so
b),
(Dia,Dib),(hia,hib),(ρia,ρib).
(1): Let 0 < ρia < 1 and (s∗
a,s∗
b) a pair satisfying
ha(s∗
a,s∗
b) + hb(s∗
a,s∗
b) ≥ ha(sr;s∗
−r) + hb(sr;s∗
−r) for all sr ∈ Sr and r = a,b. (5.3)
Then, (so
a,so
b) is an ICE in the i.d.view Γi satisfying (so
a,so
b) = (s∗
a,s∗
b).
(2): Let ρir = 1 for r = a or b. Then, (so
a,so
b) is an ICE in the i.d.view Γi if and only if
it is a Nash equilibrium in person i’s d-understanding gii.
Proof. (1): Since 0 < ρia < 1, we have Dia ￿= ∅ and Dib ￿= ∅ by (2.2). By (2.1), this
implies (so
a,so
b) ∈ Dia ∩ Dib.
Suppose that (so
a,so
b) is not an ICE. Then, there is some weak c-improving unilateral
deviation from (so
a,so
b). Let sa be such a deviation. The other cases are symmetric. In
the present case we have:
Hii([so
a,so
b]a,[so
a,so
b]b) ≤ Hii([sa,so
b]a,[sa,so
b]b); (5.4)
Hij([so
a,so
b]a,[so
a,so
b]b) ≤ Hij([sa,so
b]a,[sa,so
b]b),
where at least one holds with a strict inequality. Since (so
a,so
b) ∈ Dia ∩ Dib, we have
hii
r (so
a,so
b) = hr(so
a,so
b) and h
ij
r (so
a,so
b) = hr(so
a,so
b) for r = a,b. If (sa,so
b) / ∈ Dia∩Dib, then
h
ij
r (sa,so
b) = θr for r = a,b, so the second inequality in (5.4) becomes (1−ρia)ha(so
a,so
b)+
ρiahb(so
a,so
b) ≤ (1 − ρia)θa + ρiaθb, which is impossible by (3.2). Hence, (sa,so
b) ∈
Dia ∩ Dib. Thus, the two inequalities of (5.4) are expressed as:
ρiaha(so
a,so
b) + (1 − ρia)hb(so
a,so
b) ≤ ρiaha(sa,so
b) + (1 − ρia)hb(sa,so
b)
(1 − ρia)ha(so
a,so
b) + ρiahb(so
a,so
b) ≤ (1 − ρia)ha(sa,so
b) + ρiahb(sa,so
b),
where at least one holds with a strict inequality. Summing up these inequalities, we have
ha(so
a,so
b) + hb(so
a,so
b) < ha(sa,so
b)+ hb(sa,so
b), which is a contradiction to the choice of
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a,so
b) in (5.3).
(2): Since ρir = 1, we have Di(−r) = ∅ by (2.2). By this, we observe h
ij
r (sr;s−r) = θr
for all (sr;s−r) ∈ Si
a × Si
b. That is, h
ij
r is constant, which implies that Hij is constant.
Let (so
a,so
b) be an ICE in Γi. Since H
ij
r is constant, (so
a,so
b) being an ICE implies that
Hii
r is maximized at (so
a,so
b), which implies hii
r (sr;so
−r) ≤ hii
r (so
r;so
−r) for all sr ∈ Si
r.
The converse is obtained by tracing this argument back.
By Theorem 5.1.(1), we have the existence result for the case of 0 < ρia < 1. An
algorithm to ﬁnd a pair (s∗
a,s∗
b) satisfying (5.3) is constructed as follows: Take any pair
in the payoﬀ matrix. Then, if there is one pair with a higher sum of payoﬀs by one
person’s deviation, we move to this pair as a candidate for (s∗
a,s∗
b). If this pair has still
the same property, then we move again. Then, we will reach one pair without a further
improvement. This convergence holds since the matrix is ﬁnite and each step has an
improvement in the sum of payoﬀs. The resulting pair may not be a global maximum,
but it will satisfy (5.3); thus we have a general existence result for this case.
Theorem 5.1.(1) allows arbitrary (Dia,Dib), in which case Si
a and Si
b may be proper
subsets of Sa and Sb. If this is the case, we can relax (5.3) so that it is a maximization
condition relative to proper subsets of Sa and Sb. This generalization can be done
without much diﬃculty. However, we should notice that we have the trivial extreme
case where Dia = Dib = {((so
a,so
b)}. Apparently, this is not our target. In Section 5.2,
we will restrict our target to the case where Si
a = Sa and Si
b = Sb.
For the non-reciprocal case of ρir = 1 for r = a or b, the ICE is equivalent to NE in
his own understanding gii by Theorem 5.1.(2). Since gii is eﬀectively one-person game
in the sense that hii
−r is constant, the NE in gii is simply determined by the payoﬀ
maximization of hii
r , and person j’s behavior is unconstrained. In the PD game of Table
1.1 with Si
r = {sr1,sr2}, an ICE is either (sr2;s(−r)1) and (sr2;s(−r)2).
Finally, let us return to the problems of joint deviations and of coherency between a
PUE and an ICE. In the restriction of an PUE, a person is allowed to change his action at
each role, provided that the other sticks to the regular action so
r at role r = a,b. Without
external communication, person 1 can deviates alone, and this deviation induces the
second state (sa,so
b) of Fig.5.1. In the argument for ICE, person 1 is assumed to return
to so
b in the third state (sa,so
b) when he is assigned to role b. A natural question is why
we avoid the assumption like a PUE that 1 takes a new deviation sb in the third state,
which is also the main problem of a joint deviation.
Let us recall that the entire argument is considered in the mind of person 1. Thus,
he expects that person 2 understands his deviation in the second state as a sign to
initiate a coordinate deviation sa from (so
a,so
b). However, if he deviates again from so
b
to sb in the third state, the previous sign may be destroyed. Logically, it is possible to
expect that person 2 understands such consecutive signs, but this requires higher-order
expectations. We avoid the argument of this consecutive signs as diﬃcult. On the other
20hand, the deﬁnition (4.3) of a PUE does not involve this diﬃculty, since the other’s
understanding is not involved at all. However, when the underlying game is given as an
extensive game, some external communication may be possible, which will be discussed
brieﬂy for the example of an ultimatum game in Section 6.
We remark that a joint deviation argument may have some validity in a small game
such as a 2 ×2 game. As will be discussed, the Stag-Hunt game 2 of Table 1.3 has two
possible ICE’s, but if we allow joint deviations, only one would remain.
In a parallel manner to a mutual PUE, we have a mutual ICE: that the pair (so
a,so
b)
of regular actions is a mutual ICE iﬀ it is an ICE for Γi and i = 1,2. We have the
following corollary from Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.2 (Existence of a Mutual ICE): Let Γi be the mutual coherent i.d.views
for i = 1,2.
(1): Let 0 < ρia < 1 for i = 1,2, and suppose that (so
a,so
b) = (s∗
a,s∗
b) satisﬁes (5.3).
Then, (so
a,so
b) is a mutual ICE.
(2): Let ρ1a = ρ2b = 1. Assume (5.5) for each Γi. Then, (so
a,so
b) is a mutual ICE if and
only if it is a Nash equilibrium in the game G.
5.2. Utilitarian Theorem
A pair (s∗
a,s∗
b) given by (5.3) is always an ICE of Γi = ￿(so
a,so
b),(Si
a,Si
b),(ρia,ρib),Hii,Hij￿
with (so
a,so
b) = (s∗
a,s∗
b) for any frequency weight ρia ∈ (0,1). Since such a pair has a
special status in our theory, we call it a unilateral utilitarian point (UUP). Speciﬁcally,
for cases of ρia near 1/2, we expect the converse of Theorem 5.1.(1), i.e., every ICE is
a UUP, though rigorously speaking, we need some assumptions for it.
First of all, we restrict our attention to the internally reciprocal domains (2.3). Still,
the domains Dia and Dib are too arbitrary, as pointed out after Theorem 5.1. To simplify
our argument, we assume
Si
a = Sa and Si
b = Sb. (5.5)
We write another condition to be used in the next theorem: for all distinct (sa,sb),(s￿
a,s￿
b)
∈ S1 × S2 with sr = s￿
r for r = a or b,
ha(sa,sb) + hb(sa,sb) ￿= ha(s￿
a;s￿
b) + hb(s￿
a;s￿
b). (5.6)
That is, the payoﬀ sum diﬀers for diﬀerent pairs of unilaterally diﬀerent actions.
When Γi is given as ￿(so
a,so
b),(Si
a,Si
b),(ρia,ρib),Hii,Hij￿, we denote, by Γi(ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib),
the i.d.view obtained from Γi with the replacement of (ρia,ρib) by (ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib).
Theorem 5.3 (Utilitarian Theorem). Let Γi be the i.d.view from a memory kit κi
satisfying (2.3) and (5.5).
21(1): (so
a,so
b) is an ICE in Γi(1
2, 1
2) if and only if it is a UUP.
(2): Suppose (5.6). Then, (so
a,so
b) is a UUP if and only if there are α,β with 0 < α <
1/2 < β < 1 such that (so
a,so
b) is an ICE of Γi(ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib) for any ˆ ρia ∈ [α,β].
Proof.(1): The if part was already obtained by the proof of Theorem 5.1.(1). Sup-
pose that (so
a,so
b) is an ICE in Γi(1
2, 1
2). Since Proj(Dia) = Proj(Dib) by (2.3), we have
(sr;so
−r) ∈ Dia ∩ Dib for all sr ∈ Si
r,r = a,b. Hence hii
r and h
ij
r coincide with hr for the
domain of unilateral deviations. Thus, the condition of (so
a,so
b) to be an ICE in Γi(1
2, 1
2) is
written as 1
2ha(so
a,so
b)+ 1
2hb(so
a,so
b) ≥ 1
2ha(sr;so
−r)+ 1
2hb(sr;so
−r) for all sr ∈ Sr,r = a,b.
This means that (so
a,so
b) is a UUP.
(2): Let (so
a,so
b) be a UUP. The, by (5.6), we have 1
2ha(so
a,so
b)+1
2hb(so
a,so
b) > 1
2ha(sr;so
−r)+
1
2hb(sr;so
−r) for all sr ∈ Sr − {so
r},r = a,b. Hence, there are some α,β with 0 < α <
1/2 < β < 1 such that for any ˆ ρia ∈ [α,β],
ˆ ρiaha(so
a,so
b) + (1 − ˆ ρia)hb(so
a,so
b) ≥ ˆ ρiaha(sr;so
−r) + (1 − ˆ ρia)hb(sr;so
−r); (5.7)
(1 − ˆ ρia)ha(so
a,so
b) + ˆ ρiahb(so
a,so
b) ≥ (1 − ˆ ρia)ha(sr;so
−r) + ˆ ρiahb(sr;so
−r).
for all sr ∈ Sr,r = a,b, and at least one is a strict inequality. These mean that (so
a,so
b)
is an ICE of Γi(ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib) for any ˆ ρia ∈ [α,β].
The converse can be obtained by tracing back this argument. That is, by summing
up the inequalities of (5.7), we have the condition for (so
a,so
b) to be an UUP.
The counterpart of Corollary 5.2 for Theorem 5.3 can be stated in a similar manner.
The point of Theorem 5.3 is the equivalence between the ICE and UUP under the
reciprocal domain (2.3) for ˆ ρia = 1
2 or in some neighborhood of 1
2. Since (5.6) is naturally
expected, we would have the equivalence even for skewed weights. However, the UUP
is determined by maximization of the simple sum of payoﬀs independent of skewed
weights: Although person i detects some skewness of frequencies, the resulting outcome
is free from it. A simple utilitarian (up to unilateral domains) outcome is an ICE, which
motivates the title of the Theorem 5.3.
It may be questioned how large the size of the interval [α,β] in Theorem 5.3.(2) is,
and also what would happen outside the interval. We consider these problems in the
PD game and the SH games. For this consideration, let us denote the inﬁmum and
supremum of such α’s and β’s in Theorem 5.3.(2) by α0 and β0, respectively. These can
be calculated from the inequality system (5.7).
It would be convenient to introduce one deﬁnition: We say that (so
a,so
b) is an ICE
point for (ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib) if and only if (so
a,so
b) is an ICE in Γi(ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib) with Dia = Dib =
{(sr;so
−r) : sr ∈ Sr,r = a,b}. Since the boundary case of ρir = 1 was already discussed
in Section 5.1, we consider only the case where 0 < ˆ ρia < 1.
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consider Table 1.1. By Theorem 5.1.(1), the regular pair
22(sa1,sb1) is an ICE point for any (ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib). Since (sa1,sb1) is the unique UUP, it follows
by Theorem 5.3.(2) that there is some interval [α,β] such that for ˆ ρia ∈ [α,β], (sa1,sb1)
is the unique ICE of Γi(ˆ ρia,ˆ ρib). This holds up to [α0,β0] = [1
4, 3
4].
For any ˆ ρia ∈ (0, 1
4) ∪ (3
4,1), the other three pairs (sa1,sb2), (sa2,sb2) and (sa1,sb2)
appear as ICE points. Thus, all the pairs are ICE’s in the skewed weight case.
Stag Hunt: The SH1 game of Table 1.2 has the unique UUP (sa1,sb1). This is the
unique ICE for ˆ ρia ∈ [1
3, 2
3]. For any ˆ ρia ∈ (0, 1
3) ∪ (2
3,1), the other (sa2,sb2) appears as
an ICE point, which is also a NE.
Consider the SH2 game of Table 1.3. Here we have two UUP’s, (sa1,sb1) and
(sa2,sb2). Thus, both are ICE points for any frequency ˆ ρia ∈ (0,1). We have no
other candidates for an ICE point. As stated in the end of Section 5.1, if we allow joint
deviations, we expect only (sa1,sb1) for ˆ ρia near 1
2.
Observe the discontinuity of ICE’s at ˆ ρia = 0 or 1. Condition (2.2) is only a re-
striction on the relationship between the frequency weight ˆ ρia and domain Dir; hence,
we can assume ˆ ρia ∈ (0,1) and the unilateral domain condition (2.3). However, ˆ ρia is
a subjective evaluation of the objective frequency, and a small and precise value for
ˆ ρia is not very compatible with the bounded cognitive ability of a person. Hence, the
objective frequency of role a near 0 or 1 may be eﬀectively understood as ˆ ρia = 0 or 1.
Then, Theorem 5.1.(2) should be applied to such cases, rather than Theorem 5.3.
To analyze this problem, a simulation study like Akiyama, et al. [1] or an experi-
mental study like Takeuchi et al. [20] could give some information.
6. Extensions and Further Applications
We have already seen some applications of our theory to the PD and SH games in
Section 4. In this section, ﬁrst we mention some experimental results on PD games
with role-switching. Next, we apply our theory to an Ultimatum Game. Finally, we
discuss implications of our theory to moral philosophy.
Experimental Study: Takeuchi et al. [20] undertook experiments for the cases of no
role-switching and full role-switching for some PD games. They address the question
about subjects’ behaviors and cognitive understandings of payoﬀ values.
In the case of no role-switching, the experimental results are quite consistent with our
theory eﬀectively suggesting the Nash equilibrium. In the case of role-switching, the ICE
and NE in addition to nonconvergent behaviors are observed, which are quite consistent
with the present theory of role-switching. A salient point of an experiment is to enable
us to study the behavioral and cognitive postulates, in particular, how the process
converges from the phase of trial and error to equilibrium, and how persons learn the
payoﬀs. From the answers to the questionnaire given after the experiment, we analyzed
the relationship between the payoﬀ understandings and their behaviors. In many cases,
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Figure 6.1: Ultimatum Game
Postulates BP1, BP2 and Postulates EP1, EP2 are supported and sometimes sharpened.
Those ﬁndings complement our theoretical study.
Ultimatum Game: A person assigned to role a proposes a division (xa,xb) of $100 to
persons 1 and 2, and a person assigned to b receives the proposal (xa,xb) and chooses
an answer Y or N to the proposal. We assume that only three alternative choices are
available at a, i.e., Sa = {(99,1),(50,50),(1,99)}. The person at role b chooses Y or
N contingent upon the oﬀer made by a, i.e., Sb = {(α1,α2,α3) : α1,α2,α3 ∈ {Y,N}}.
If the person at role a chooses (99,1) and if the person at b chooses (α1,α2,α3), the
outcome depends only upon α1; if α1 = Y, they receive (99,1) and if α1 = N, they
receive (0,0). For the other cases, we deﬁne payoﬀs in a parallel manner. The game is
depicted in Fig.6.1.
This game has a unique backward induction solution: ((99,1),(Y,Y,Y )). This is
quite incompatible with experimental results (cf., Camerer [3]), which have indicated
that (50,50) is more likely chosen by the person at a.
Here, we assume one additional component for the persons. They have a strictly
concave and monotone utility function u(m) over [0,100]. This introduction does not
change the above equilibrium outcome. But it changes the ICE.
Under the assumption that person i has the reciprocal active-passive domains DAP
ia =
DAP
ib and ρia = 1/2, the pair ((99,1),(Y,Y,Y )) is not an ICE, since
1
2
ha((99,1),(Y,Y,Y )) +
1
2
hb((99,1),(Y,Y,Y ))
=
1
2
u(99) +
1
2
u(1) < u(50) =
1
2
u(50) +
1
2
u(50)
=
1
2
ha((50,50),(Y,Y,Y )) +
1
2
hb((50,50),(Y,Y,Y )).
The inequality follows the strict concavity of u. In this game, an ICE is given as
((50,50),(α1,Y,α3)), where α1,α3 may be Y or N.
24We do have other ICE’s, for example, ((99,1),(Y,N,N)) and even ((1,99),(N,N,Y )),
which are also Nash equilibria of this game. However, this game is an extensive game
having some information transmission. This suggests an extension of our theory to ex-
tensive games or information protocols such as in [9], [10] in order to possibly reduce
the set of ICE’s.
In the above ultimatum game, we can allow joint and mutually beneﬁcial deviations.
In Fig.6.1, when person i at role a deviates, person j at role b sees i’s deviation at role
a before j’s move. This diﬀers from the strategic game case, where when one person
takes an initiative to start a deviation but the other notices it after his move. Thus,
in the ultimatum game, person i could anticipate that j will respond to i’s deviation
at a with a mutually beneﬁcial deviation at role b. For example, the deviation from
((99,1),(Y,N,N)) to ((50,50),(Y,Y,Y )) could be used to eliminate ((99,1),(Y,N,N)).
When we allow joint deviations for the ICE, ((50,50),(α1,Y,α3)) are only the ICE’s.
Implications of Our Results for Social Morality: The experimental results often
diﬀer from the non-cooperative game-theoretical predictions, but are rather closer to
our utilitarian results. Experimental theorists have tried to interpret these in terms of
“fairness”, “altruism”, and/or “social preferences”, which are expressed as constraint
maximization of additional objective functions (cf., Camerer [3]). In contrast, we have
extended and speciﬁed the basic social context with role-switching, and derived the
emergence of cooperation. Our approach may be regarded as providing structural foun-
dations for “fairness”, “altruism”, and “social preferences”.
It is our contention that as far as a situation is recurrent and reciprocal enough, the
persons possibly cooperate in the form of the simple payoﬀ sum maximization. Such
behavior might be brought to and observed in experiments.
This gives an experiential grounding for morality, which may be expressed in the form
of “utilitarianism” of Theorem 5.3. It has a similarity with Adam Smith’s [19] “moral
sentiments” in which a person derives the viewpoint of the (impartial) “spectator” by
imagining a social situation. This argument assumes that the spectator has the ability of
sympathy and understanding of the target social situation. Our argument explains how
the person gets his understanding of the situation and the other’s through role-switching
and transpersonal projection.
7. External and Internal Reciprocities
Internal reciprocity (2.3), which was used as a key condition in our analysis, represents
reciprocity across the roles within the same person i. In this section we show that (2.3)
can be motivated and derived from entirely external conditions, by which we mean
comparisons of the domains of person i with those of person j. Also, we give a comment
on the relationship between frequency weights and external reciprocities.
25Let us start with the accumulated domains D1 = (D1a,D1b) and D2 = (D2a,D2b)
for persons 1 and 2 with the regular actions (so
a,so
b). These domains are externally
correlated since the passive experiences of one person are generated by active experiences
of the other. Based on this, we could impose the following condition on domains of
accumulation: For all sr ∈ Sr, r = a,b and i,j = 1,2 (i ￿= j),
(sr;so
−r) ∈ Dj(−r) implies (sr;so
−r) ∈ Dir. (7.1)
That is, if j at role −r keeps a passive experience (sr;so
−r), then i keeps the same pair
as an active experience. This means that a person is more sensitive to being active than
passive. Condition (7.1) has an element of external reciprocity but is a rather weak
form since even the non-reciprocal active domains DN
1 and DN
2 given by (2.4) satisfy
(7.1).
As time passes, each person may have learned also passive experiences. Eventually,
the converse of (7.1) could hold: For all sr ∈ Sr, r = a,b and i = 1,2,
(sr;so
−r) ∈ Dj(−r) if and only if (sr;so
−r) ∈ Dir. (7.2)
The non-reciprocal active domains DN
1 and DN
2 fail to satisfy (7.2), but this does not
yet imply the internal reciprocity of (2.3). Condition (7.2) requires the two persons to
have the same sensitivities, but allows them to have diﬀerent trial deviations.
Condition (7.2) describes how one person’s deviation may aﬀect his own and the
other’s memories. There is another interpersonal condition on the relationship between
both persons’ deviations and memories. It is the coincidence assumption that the two
persons have the same trial deviations at each role: for all sr ∈ Sr, r = a,b and i = 1,2,
(sr;so
−r) ∈ Djr if and only if (sr;so
−r) ∈ Dir. (7.3)
That is, when each person takes the same role, both have the same deviations and
memories.
Both (7.2) and (7.3) are external relationships, but they are enough to guarantee
the internal reciprocity of (2.3), and also the other external reciprocity.
Theorem 7.1 (Internal-External Reciprocity). Conditions (7.2) and (7.3) hold for
D1 = (D1a,D1b) and D2 = (D2a,D2b) if and only if (2.3) and
(External Reciprocity): Proj(D1r) = Proj(D2r) for r = a,b.
Proof. When (2.3) and External Reciprocity, the four sets, Proj(Dir), i = 1,2 and
r = a,b coincide. Hence, the if-part is straightforward. We prove the only-if part.
Suppose (7.2) and (7.3) for D1 and D2.
Consider (2.3). Let (sa,sb) ∈ Proj(D1a), i.e., (sa,sb) = (sa,so
b) or (so
a,sb). Fist, let
(sa,sb) = (sa,so
b). Then, (sa,so
b) ∈ Proj(D2a) by (7.3), which is written as (sa;so
−a) ∈
26Proj(D2a). By (7.2), we have (sa;so
−a) ∈ Proj(D1(−a)), i.e., (sa,so
b) ∈ Proj(D1b). Next,
let (sa,sb) = (so
a,sb). Thus, (sb;so
−b) ∈ Proj(D1(−b)). We have (sb;so
−b) ∈ Proj(D2b) by
(7.2). Hence, by (7.3), (sb;so
−b) ∈ Proj(D1b). We have shown Proj(Dia) ⊆ Proj(Dib).
The converse is obtained by a symmetric argument. Thus, we have (2.3).
Consider External Reciprocity. Let (sa,sb) ∈ Proj(D1a), i.e., (sa,sb) = (sa,so
b) or
(so
a,sb). Let (sa,sb) = (sa,so
b). By (7.3), we have (sa,so
b) ∈ Proj(D2a). i.e., (sa;so
−a) ∈
Proj(D2a). Now, let (sa,sb) = (so
a,sb). By (1), (so
a,sb) ∈ Proj(D1b). This is written as
(sb;so
−b) ∈ Proj(D1b). By (7.2), we have (sb;so
−b) ∈ Proj(D2a). We have shown that
Proj(D1a) ⊆ Proj(D2a). The converse is obtained by a symmetric argument. Thus we
have External Reciprocity.
We have interpreted frequency weights as a subjective understanding. To study the
relationships between these and internal and external reciprocities on Di’s, we should re-
fer to objective frequency weights. In the experimental study of Takeuchi et al. [20], the
frequency weights are assumed to be externally given as the alternating role-switching
as well as no role-switching. Because of the basis of bounded rationality, it would be
diﬃcult for a person to evaluate frequency weights accurately. When the objective
frequency weights are skewed slightly, a tendency is expected to take them as equally
weighted. Nevertheless, when the objective weights are more skewed, the domains Di’s
could be skewed.
For example, consider the objective frequencies 1
3 for role a. Then, person i experi-
ences role b twice more than role a. To have the same number of experiences of b, he
needs 2 times longer than for a. By Postulate EP1, he may forget previous experiences
even if he has had the same number of experiences for role a. Therefore, at a point of
time, the domain D1a may be much smaller than D1b. Thus, the internal reciprocity of
(2.3) may not be expected for cases far from objective frequency 1
2 for role a.
8. Conclusions
We have introduced the concept of social roles into IGT in order to study an experien-
tial foundation of a person’s and the other’s understanding of their situation. Based on
this foundation, we have shown the possibility for the emergence of cooperation, and
argued that cooperation is more likely achieved when role-switching is more reciprocal.
The foundational study and cooperation result have implications to the three important
literatures: (1) Mead’s [15] argument for role-switching and cooperation, (2) coopera-
tive game theory, and (3) noncooperative game theory from the perspective of ex ante
decision making. Since our analysis is restricted to the 2-person cases, we ﬁrst give a
comment on this restriction before talking about (1), (2) and (3).
In an extension to situations with more than two persons, we would have a lot
of diﬃculties. We should notice that the number of role assignments is exponentially
27increasing with the number of people. Even in the 3-role case, there are many role-
assignments. It would be diﬃcult, from the perspective of ﬁnite and bounded cognitive
abilities, to treat all the role assignments. Role-switching between two persons may be
still essential for studying the cases with three or more people.
A key to such an extension is patterned behavior in diﬀerent but similar situations.
An important element of patterned behavior is regularity and uniformity, which could
ease diﬃculties involved in reaching cooperation. This view is related to the very basic
presumption of IGT: A social situation formulated as a 2-role game (more generally,
an n-role game) is not isolated from other social situations in the entire social web as
depicted in Fig.1.1. This may help us take future steps of extensions of the approach of
this paper. Role-switching between two people is a building block for such a situation.
In Mead’s [15] baseball example, a pitcher understands a third baseman’s perspective if
he has experienced that role a few times, and a catcher understands it also if he plays
third, etc. Also, once a pitcher understands the perspective of a third, he may extend
his understanding to the other inﬁelders, though some or many details diﬀer from third.
Our analysis based on the 2-person cases could be a base for such considerations.
This argument is quite diﬀerent from the cooperative game theory literature from
von Neumann-Morgenstern [21]. The general cooperative game theory starts allowing
all possible coalitions to cooperate and giving attainable payoﬀs by their cooperations.
This approach apparently deviates from our basic postulate of people with bounded
abilities. However, in the some literature such as that of “an assignment games” initi-
ated by Shapley-Shubik [18], permissible coalitions are restricted to 2-person coalitions.
A consideration of a connection to this literature may give a hint to do research in
the direction above discussed, though it would be diﬃcult to have a direct connection
between this literature and the extension of our approach suggested above.
Finally, we should give comments on (3). Our approach is related to the problem
of “common knowledge” or “higher-order beliefs”, though we only informally touch
these problems. Often, the common knowledge is regarded as necessary (or suﬃcient)
for the Nash equilibrium concept from the perspective of ex ante decision making.
Our approach could be regarded as exploring a source for the common knowledge of
the game situation, but the reciprocal case, which is central to our approach, allows
the cooperation results. That is, in our approach, a kind of “common knowledge” is
obtained, and at the same time, cooperation is arising.
This should not be interpreted as meaning that our approach denies the Nash equi-
librium from the perspective of ex ante decision making based on the common knowledge
assumption. The reason is not due to the Nash equilibrium result for the partial use case
(Theorem 4.1), but is that we did not take the perspective of ex ante decision making for
our cooperative result. To have our cooperation result, we needed the whole elements of
the dynamic feature of the frequency weights for role-switching and the average payoﬀs.
We have pursued some new possible scenario diﬀerent from the standard one.
28Nonetheless, since our concept of a transpersonal view treats higher-order beliefs,
some reader may ask about the relationship of our approach to higher-order beliefs in the
game theory literature. Here, we consider two approaches treating higher-order beliefs.
One is the universal-type space approach (cf., Mertens-Zamir [16] and Brandenburger-
Dekel [2]), and the other is the epistemic logic approach (cf., Fagin, et al. [6], Kaneko
[8], and Kaneko-Suzuki [13]). Since the next step of our research is to treat higher-order
beliefs more explicitly, it may be helpful to discuss salient diﬀerences between our theory
and those approaches.
An apparent diﬀerence is that our theory asks the source for higher-order beliefs,
while the other approaches treat higher-order beliefs as exogenously given. We do not
need to discuss this diﬀerence furthermore. Rather, it would be helpful to discuss which,
the universal-type space approach or the epistemic logic approach, is more natural for
an explicit treatment of our approach.
We adopted the representation of “beliefs” in terms of neither types nor subjective
probabilities; instead, the beliefs are expressed in terms of classical game theory. The
targets of a person’s beliefs are the structures of a game including the regular actions
and frequency weights. In the universal-type approach, these are expressed as types; a
distinction between two types is basic for the approach, and there is no further structure
in a type. We think that the internal structure of an individual view is essential for
the present research as well as future developments, since we can talk directly about
interpersonal as well as intrapersonal inferences, which are also important aspects of
people with bounded abilities.
These structures can be described by a formal language of the epistemic logic ap-
proach. This extension has various merits: We can focus on the beliefs about the
structure for the persons. This leads us to an explicit treatment of the persons’ logical
inferences including inductive and deductive inferences. Also, we may avoid the “com-
mon knowledge”; Kaneko-Suzuki [13] already developed an epistemic logic with shallow
interpersonal depths. This is also motivated by our basic presumption that people are
boundedly rational, as discussed in Section 2.2. Nevertheless, it needs a lot of steps to
develop a clear connection between them.
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